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1. INTRODUCTION

From its earliest days I have believed that the Institute for Strategic Studies could do something which badly needed to be done and which, to my mind, could be done in no other way. It could provide a forum in which strategy could be discussed on a non-compartmentalized basis, where military strategy could be related to political strategy, armament policy related to arms control, U.K. strategy related to U.S. strategy, and both subsumed under NATO and general Western strategy. Furthermore, it could provide a forum where those out of office could discuss matters with the same seriousness as though they were in office, and those in office could enjoy some of the protection from direct quotation and some of the freedom of expression enjoyed by those out of office. The Institute has and is fulfilling this promise. It is with pleasure that I find myself with you this afternoon.

When Alastair Buchan first invited me to speak before your group, he gave as the reason that U.S. defense policy was unclear and not understood in Europe and that I might do something toward clarifying the intentions guiding United States policy. I replied that I thought the shoe was, rather, on the other foot, that the United States defense policy had been made reasonably clear both in word and in action. The questions which seemed to me to press more urgently for answers revolved about European defense policies including those of the United Kingdom. So my first response to Alastair was that I would much enjoy coming to a meeting of the Institute to listen to a discussion of the latter subject, rather than to speak myself to the former.

A number of circumstances, including an article in the Wall Street Journal, our leading financial publication, purporting to reflect current London views on NATO strategy, caused me to realize that the bases of U.S. policy apparently are not fully appreciated or understood by many people over here and that it would be worthwhile to exchange views with you on U.S. defense policy.

The point made by the Wall Street Journal article was that the idea of using conventional weapons to achieve a military pause was regarded in London as being dead and buried; that it had more holes than a piece of Swiss cheese; that it reflected weakness, was defeatist, and undermined the credibility of the deterrent. We in the U.S. agree that the word "pause" should be rejected because of its imprecision; it may connote non-action or have other unacceptable overtones. On the other hand, the notion of the desirability of an increase in the non-nuclear capability of the alliance, along with an expansion and improvement in its nuclear capabilities, in our view, is not only not dead, but is very live indeed. Increasing its non-nuclear capabilities is what the alliance has in fact been doing in connection with the Berlin crisis: with, I believe, positive results. This increase in our non-nuclear capabilities is not a reflection of weakness, it is not defeatist, and it has measurably increased the credibility of the deterrent. Furthermore, recent Soviet actions, although always somewhat ambiguous, are in our view consistent with this evaluation, not with that expressed in the Wall Street Journal article.

But I am getting ahead of myself. The nuclear-non-nuclear balance is obviously only one of a number of interrelated issues of Western defense strategy and policy. Let me therefore first say a few words about the evolution of defense policy in the Kennedy Administration.